← All posts Читать на русском

TSPU Deep Dive: Modern Traffic Classification Techniques

By late 2025, the Russian internet has fully entered the era of "smart" filtering. We analyze how modern classification algorithms manage backbone traffic.

Found an inaccuracy? Report an issue ↗
TL;DRQuick summary

Analyze the shift from IP blocking to behavioral analysis, discover the mechanics behind the '13 KB limit,' and learn how active probing verifies nodes in real-time.


Introduction: The Point of No Return

By December 2025, the architecture of the Runet has become inseparable from TSPU (Technical Means of Counteracting Threats). We have passed the point of no return: traffic filtering is no longer an “external filter”; it is built into the very logic of packet transmission at the backbone level. The modern TSPU system is a distributed network of neural network analyzers capable of classifying millions of connections in real-time and simulating technical failures where direct restriction is impractical.

Chapter 1. DPI Evolution: The Shift to Granular Packet Analysis.

The history of filtering systems in Russia is divided into “before” and “after” 2018. The failed attempt to restrict Telegram via IP address registries served as a lesson that forced the regulator to completely overhaul its technology stack.

1.1 Lessons of 2018: Why IP Restrictions Died

In 2018, the regulator tried to stop services by blacklisting millions of cloud provider IP addresses. The result was massive collateral damage: the collapse of banking systems, retail, and smart homes.

The regulator’s main conclusions:

  • Economic Unacceptability: “Clumsy” methods cause more damage to the digital economy than the filtering effect is worth.
  • Uselessness Against Distributed Networks: Dynamic IP shifting makes the registry-based approach meaningless.

1.2 The Birth of TSPU: Centralization and “Stealth Mode”

The “Sovereign Internet” law passed in 2019 shifted control from IP addresses to the physical level of the backbones. TSPU complexes—“black boxes” based on Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)—were installed at the communication nodes of all major operators.

Key features of the 2025 architecture:

  1. Centralization: The telecom operator no longer manages the filtering. All commands come directly from the CMU SSOP.
  2. Payload Inspection: TSPU analyzes not only headers but also the content of the packet.
  3. Drop Tactics: The system is capable of restricting specific protocols without breaking the session itself or interfering with adjacent legitimate services on the same IP.

Chapter 2. Traffic Management Mechanisms: Timeouts and Session Limits.

By 2025, TSPU moved from primitive filtering to a data accumulation strategy. Now, the system doesn’t make a decision instantly; it “waits” until a session gathers a critical mass of attributes for classification.

2.1 The “13 KB” Phenomenon: Classifier Saturation Point

One of the main technical features of 2024–2025 was the dropping of HTTPS sessions exactly after the transmission of 13–16 Kilobytes of data. This is a managed stateful behavior of the DPI.

Why exactly 13–16 KB? For modern TSPU ML models, this volume is the “Saturation Point.” This range covers the connection establishment, certificate exchange, and the first encrypted Application Data packets. This is enough to classify the traffic type with high probability. Once the statistics are gathered, the system activates the restriction.

2.2 Comparative Analysis of Connectivity by Autonomous Systems (AS)

TSPU policy in 2025 is extremely heterogeneous and depends on the target IP address ownership:

Hosting / CDNNature of Filtering (2025)
Cloudflare (AS13335)Total ECH drop and a hard 13 KB limit.
Hetzner (AS24940)Regional throttling. Frequent drops at the TLS stage in some regions.
DigitalOcean (AS14061)Port filtering. Restriction of standard ports via ML signature.
OVH (AS16276)UDP Trigger. IP restriction for 10 minutes upon detection of atypical UDP traffic.

2.3 Russian Hostings: “Ban-on-Sight” Strategy and BGP-Flowspec

Inside the Russian segment, systems apply immediate traffic restriction policies. Here, the system is integrated directly with the BGP routing of backbone providers.

The Mechanics of a “Black Hole”:

  1. Detection: TSPU identifies an initialization packet of an illegitimate connection.
  2. Signaling: CMU SSOP instantly initiates a “null route” announcement via BGP Flowspec.
  3. Result: Traffic to the IP is dropped at the nearest major backbone node.

Temporary Blackholes: An innovation of 2025 is dynamic 15-minute restrictions. Upon detecting atypical traffic, the IP address is restricted for a short period. If activity resumes after the restrictions are lifted, the period increases progressively.

Chapter 3. Active Verification Mechanisms (Active Probing) in Modern Networks.

By mid-2025, the Russian TSPU system fully adopted the most effective tactic—Active Probing. While the system was previously a passive observer, it has now become an active participant in the network dialogue, capable of performing automatic server response checks.

3.1 TSPU Active Probes: Real-time Re-verification Mechanics

When a TSPU algorithm detects a connection to a foreign host that defies instant classification, the system initiates a series of probe requests from its nodes.

How an active probe works:

  1. Anomaly Detection: A user initiates a connection. TSPU sees an atypical session fingerprint or packet length distribution.
  2. Probe Trigger: Parallel to the user’s session (or immediately after its drop), TSPU sends its own packets to the target server IP.
  3. Response Analysis: The probe might simulate a regular client request. The goal is to provoke the server into a response that reveals its true nature.

According to research, the delay between the user’s request and the arrival of an active probe from the system in 2025 is only 200–500 ms, making this process practically invisible.

Chapter 4. Transition to Behavioral ML-Analysis (Machine Learning)

By late 2025, the “one signature — one restriction” paradigm finally gave way to multi-factor analysis. Massive investments in TSPU modernization allowed for the deployment of ML clusters capable of processing terabits of traffic per second, identifying hidden patterns without the need for content decryption.

4.1 Analysis of Entropy and Statistical Profiles

One of the fundamental characteristics of any tunneled traffic is the high entropy (degree of randomness) of the data. The difference that TSPU ML models learned to see in 2025 lies in the statistical profile of the session.

Classification Features:

  • Session Structure: Regular web surfing is an alternation of short requests and bursts of responses. A persistent tunnel is characterized by a long session with monotonically high entropy.
  • Bidirectional Symmetry: ML models analyze the ratio of incoming and outgoing traffic. Specialized communication channels often have a more symmetrical ratio than classic HTTP traffic.

4.2 Timing Attacks and Temporal Fingerprinting

By late 2025, TSPU began actively using Temporal Fingerprinting. Intervals between packets (Inter-Packet Arrival times) reveal the nature of the application.

Temporal Analysis Methods:

  • Interactivity Detection: Sessions used for console work have a specific packet rhythm corresponding to human typing.
  • Heartbeat Signals: Many protocols send packets to maintain the connection (Keep-alive) at strictly defined intervals. ML models find this cyclicality in the general data stream.

4.3 Packet Size Distribution

A key analysis factor in 2025 is the payload size distribution. TSPU builds packet length histograms for every connection in real-time.

If all packets in a session have sizes characteristic of specific protocols, or display abnormal uniformity (due to fixed padding), the ML model flags this as an anomaly. Modern analysis methods allow distinguishing natural network noise from software attempts to mask traffic structure.

Chapter Conclusion

In the era of ML filtering, encrypting data is not enough. Any statistical deviation in timing or packet size becomes a trigger for activating restrictions.

Chapter 5. Geography and the Architecture of “Filtering Islands”

By late 2025, an architecture of “filtering islands” has formed, where the technical capabilities of network access depend on the user’s geographical location and provider.

5.1 Regional Proving Grounds

Analysis of 2025 monitoring data shows that new filtering methods are tested on specific regions before a federal launch.

  • North Caucasus: A region with strict policies, often used for testing significant UDP traffic restrictions.
  • Volga Region: A proving ground for ML analyzers, training on dense urban traffic.
  • Siberia and Far East: The “13 KB” anomaly is frequent here due to cross-border channel specifics and harsh TSPU settings for foreign AS.
  • Moscow and Saint Petersburg: Feature extensive “white lists” for business infrastructure, though mobile networks are filtered as strictly as in regions.

5.2 Policy Fragmentation by Provider: Mobile vs. Fixed

Mobile Networks: Mobile operators moved to a model where unidentified encrypted traffic may be preemptively slowed down. This is where resource-intensive behavioral analysis models are tested.

Fixed Internet: Classical SNI and IP filtering, supplemented by the “13 KB limit,” are more common here. Providers are forced to leave more exceptions for corporate software.

Chapter 6. Evolution of Application Solutions.

The technological dominance of TSPU in 2025 has forced the development of network solutions that mimic the legitimate behavior of browsers or microservices. The main task of such systems is to create a load on the DPI that is economically disadvantageous for the system to process.

Conclusion: Results of Predictive Traffic Analysis Systems Deployment.

By the end of 2025, the Russian traffic filtering system completed its transformation from a static “black list” model to a dynamic, predictive ecosystem.

Key Conclusions of 2025:

  1. Behavioral Analysis instead of Signatures: ML and active probing now play the leading role. The system looks for “atypical traffic behavior.”
  2. Network Fragmentation: Resource availability can vary between regions depending on local TSPU node settings.
  3. Technical Costs: Aggressive filtering sometimes leads to false positives, affecting banking APIs and corporate services.
  4. Network Quality Degradation: Constant packet inspection has led to increased latency (RTT) on several routes, a technological price for deep analysis systems.

In 2026, the boundary between specialized network traffic and normal web service operation is expected to blur further.

Verify it yourself

Sources

44
01 Xray-core: XHTTP (SplitHTTP) multiplex controller h2/h3 specificationGitHub 02 JA4+ Network Fingerprinting: The new weapon for analysts in 2025Fox IT 03 GitHub Net4People: Issue #551 - Countering RTT fingerprinting in REALITYGitHub 04 Medium: All you need to know about JA3 & JA4 FingerprintsMedium 05 IETF: Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) and DPIIETF 06 NTC.party: Best xray protocol and transmission for mobile networks (2025)NTC.party 07 arXiv: TCP Delayed ACK as a defense against RTT-based censorshiparXiv 08 UPB System Security: Circumventing the GFW with TLS Record FragmentationUPB 09 arXiv: Deep Learning for Real-time Encryption Protocol IdentificationarXiv 10 GitHub: XTLS/libXray - XHTTP link config implementationGitHub 11 MDPI: GRPC-based SDN control and telemetry in high-load environmentsMDPI 12 GlobalCheck: Статистика блокировок UDP-портов в регионах РФ (2025)GlobalCheck 13 arXiv: Fingerprinting Obfuscated Proxy Traffic with Computer VisionarXiv 14 Xray REALITY: How to choose the best destination domain for maskingcscot 15 IETF: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Encrypted Client HelloIETF 16 GitHub Net4People: Issue #65 - Active Probing behavior in Russian ISPsGitHub 17 ResearchGate: Real-time network packet classification using MLResearchGate 18 IETF: QUIC (HTTP/3) transport protocol as a censorship targetIETF 19 GitHub: XTLS Xray-core - Discussion #3785: Building a master config 2025GitHub 20 MDPI: Statistical Analysis of Network Traffic for VPN detectionMDPI 21 Arxiv 2025: Discriminative Power of Cross-layer RTTsarXiv 22 Gazeta.ru: Рост популярности XHTTP в России на фоне блокировок VLESSGazeta.ru 23 GitHub Net4People: Issue #433 - ML-DPI classification patternsGitHub 24 Reddit r/WireGuard: How to get past DPI using AmneziaWG (2025)Reddit 25 arXiv: TCP Socket Splitting - Performance vs Censorship ResistancearXiv 26 NTC.party: Анализ активного зондирования ТСПУ на портах 443 и 8080NTC.party 27 GitHub: AmneziaVPN - Parameters tuning for mobile networksGitHub 28 IETF: Using TLS 1.3 to improve privacy and bypass censorshipIETF 29 NTC.party: Обсуждение лимитов 16 КБ на провайдерах (2025)NTC.party 30 arXiv: The Impact of BBR on Censorship Circumvention SystemsarXiv 31 GitHub Issue #490: Censor has a new method of blocking (13KB Limit)GitHub 32 Cloudflare Blog: Russian internet users access to the open InternetCloudflare 33 arXiv: Understanding Routing-Induced Censorship Changes (2024)arXiv 34 GitHub Net4People: Issue #363 - Blocking of fully encrypted protocolsGitHub 35 GitHub: Zapret - Bypass DPI techniques via TCP fragmentationGitHub 36 GoodbyeDPI: Deep Packet Inspection circumvention utilityGitHub 37 Habr: Разбор прошивок ТСПУ - Что внутри «черных ящиков» РКНHabr 38 GlobalCheck: Мониторинг доступности Cloudflare ECH в РФGlobalCheck 39 GitHub AmneziaVPN: Issue #1010 - AmneziaWG detection by DPIGitHub 40 SearchEngines.guru: ТСПУ РКН против Российского хостингаSearchEngines 41 LinkedIn: Russia’s 2025 Internet Clampdown - Economic implicationsLinkedIn 42 Hacker News: Russian Internet users access to VPNs (Discussion)Hacker News 43 SecurityLab: Новые методы детекции VPN-протоколовSecurityLab 44 IEEE: Machine Learning in Traffic ClassificationIEEE

More in the channel.

Short notes, new writing, and what I am currently building. You can also message me directly about projects and ideas.
Channel Message